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CHAPTER

Andrew N. Rowan and Beth Rosen

Introduction

B

ritish philosopher John Stuart Mill once said: “All great
movements experience three
stages: Ridicule. Discussion. Adoption.” (in Wiebers, Gillan, and
Wiebers 2000, 169). As movements
reach the level of adoption into
mainstream society, they acquire a
certain level of legitimacy, often
reinforced through the passage of
legislation that validates the fundamental principles they promote.
Contemporary theorist Bill Moyer’s
(1987) conceptualization of a social
movement’s evolution adds greater
complexity to Mill’s assertion.
Moyer asserts that a social movement has eight stages, which operate cyclically (although the various
goals within the movement may be
at different stages at any one time).
The first three stages cover the
early organization and recruitment
of adherents. The movement then
typically gains momentum from a
“trigger event”—one that brings
public awareness to a social problem—that pushes the movement
into stage four. In this stage, the
media “discovers” the movement,
and the wider public begins to
attend to the movement’s issues.
This is a relatively short phase (for
the modern phase of the animal
protection movement, it lasted for

about fifteen years, until 1990)
(Herzog 1995). In stages five and
six, some movement followers
enter the dead-end phase five.
These followers perceive the lack of
major legislative change emanating
from the media attention as a failure and either burn out or develop
much more aggressive techniques.
Stage six is peopled by those followers and organizations that take
advantage of the media attention
to get at least some of the issues
onto the public agenda, leading to
some concrete achievements. Ultimately Moyer defines social movements as “collective actions in
which the populace is alerted, educated, and mobilized, over the
years and decades, to challenge the
power holders and the whole society to redress social problems or
grievances and restore critical
social values” (Moyer 1987, 3).
The animal protection movement has historically relied on legislation as a key element to promote and enact its reform agenda.
Moyer’s model helps to place and
analyze when, why, and how the
movement (or parts of it) gets its
issues onto the public agenda. Over
the years, animal organizations
have committed significant effort
and resources to the passage of leg-

islation leading to greater legal
protection for animals. However,
some eras have led to the passage
of more laws than have other eras.
From 1900 to 1950, only one federal law addressing animals was
passed, although individual states
did pass or amend animal protection laws during this period. Table 1
lists the federal laws passed and
amended that deal with animal protection, demonstrating the considerable success and increase in
political influence that the animal
movement has enjoyed in the second half of the twentieth century.
Federal law is only one dimension of the movement’s legislative
reform, however. Its political influence has reached not only Congress but also state legislatures,
which are also much more active in
addressing animal issues. One of
the more significant accomplishments for the animal protection
movement has been the passage
over the last two decades of felonylevel animal-cruelty statutes that
permit certain abuses against animals to be prosecuted as felonies
rather than as misdemeanors, as in
the past. Nine states passed felony
animal-cruelty laws between 1994
and 1997 (Table 2) and the pace
accelerated between 1998 and
79

Table 1
Federal Legislative Summary,
1958–2003
Year

Federal Legislation Passed/Amended

1958

Humane Slaughter Act

1959

Wild Horses Act

1962

Bald and Golden Eagle Act

1966

Endangered Species Act
Laboratory Animal Welfare Act

1970

Animal Welfare Act (amendments to Laboratory Animal
Welfare Act)

1971

Wild Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act

1972

Marine Mammal Protection Act

1973

Endangered Species Act amendments
CITES

1976

Animal Welfare Act amendments
Horse Protection Act
Fur Seal Act

1978

Humane Slaughter Act amendments

1985

Animal Welfare Act amendments (focus on alternatives
and pain and distress)
PHS Policy on animals in research revised

1990

Animal Welfare Act amendments

1992

Wild Bird Conservation Act

1993

International Dolphin Conservation Act
Driftnet Fishery Conservation Act
NIH Revitalization [Reauthorization] Act mandates development
of research methods using no animals

1995

USDA ends face branding

1999

Ban on the interstate shipment of “crush videos”

2000

Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance,
and Protection Act

2002

Dog and Cat Protection Act
Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of
Alternative Methods (ICCVAM) Authorization Act
Safe Air Travel for Animals Act
Ban on interstate transportation of birds and dogs for fighting
purposes

2003

Captive Exotic Animal Protection Act

Source: Unti and Rowan 2001, 34–37; HSUS 2004.

2001, as an additional sixteen
states adopted felony legislation.
As of 2003 forty-one states and the
District of Columbia had felony
level animal-cruelty statutes on
80

their books, and Nebraska, Montana, Connecticut, Texas, Nevada,
Virginia, and Colorado had upgraded their original felony animalcruelty laws.

Even with the greater momentum in the states to enact state
felony anti-cruelty legislation,
other legislative initiatives were not
successful. The animal protection
movement began to adopt a new
tactic, the citizen-initiative (“direct
democracy”) process, in the twenty
or so states that allowed such petitions. Between 1990 and 2002,
twenty animal protection initiatives
were passed, and six anti-animal
measures were defeated. Overall,
thirty-nine initiatives that affected
animal protection were introduced
during the period and, in twenty-six
cases, the result was a win for animal protection.
However, passage of new legislation does not necessarily provide
satisfactory protections for animals. The new legislation must be
supported by adequate funding and
effective enforcement. Little if any
legislation is perfect, and usually
continuing efforts to improve a
statute will be needed.
As the animal movement has
gained more political authority
and public acceptance, it needs
better ways to assess and follow its
progress—or lack thereof—towards its goals. In this era, in
which nonprofits and funding
agencies are demanding better
measures of effectiveness, the animal movement needs to examine
how it looks at the progress it is
(or is not) making in gaining better legal protection for animals.

Federal
Legislation
Between 1958 and 1972 three
major pieces of federal animal protection legislation were passed,
t h e H u m a n e S l a u g h t e r Ac t
(1958), the Animal Welfare Act
(1966), and the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (1972). These
serve as the basis for the following
analysis. Given that before 1958,
the last federal animal protection
legislation that had passed was in
The State of the Animals III: 2005

1906, these three legislative victories, plus the other legislation listed in Table 1, demonstrate the rise
of the animal movement from
political oblivion in the first half of
the twentieth century to a position
where lawmakers would listen if
the context and the proposal were
timely and supported by the societal and political mood. (The
Endangered Species Act was also
passed during this period and was
supported by many animal protection organizations, but it is not
strictly animal protection legislation, that is, it does not seek to
prevent or prohibit animal distress
or suffering caused by the human
use of animals.)
The Humane Slaughter Act
(HSA) established a very basic
humane standard of care for farm
animals during slaughter (namely,
that they should be made insensible to pain). The Animal Welfare
Act mandates humane standards
for the handling, treatment, and
transportation of “any warm blooded animal used for research, testing, experimentation, or exhibition
purposes,” although farm animals
used in food production and birds,
mice, and rats used in research are
excluded from its coverage. The
Marine Mammal Protection Act
imposes a moratorium on “harassing, hunting, capturing, or killing
all marine mammals” (Animal Welfare Institute 1990, 190).

Humane Methods
of Slaughter Act:
An Assessment
In the early days of The Humane
Society of the United States
(HSUS), after its split from the
American Humane Association
(AHA) in 1954, Fred Myers, HSUS
president, was determined to
instill a broader vision of the
importance of nationally organized
initiatives and to lead local organizations in setting their sights on
achieving larger strategic objectives (HSUS 1956). One of the

points of tension in the internal
AHA schism concerned the preslaughter handling and slaughter of
animals used for food. Therefore, it
is not surprising that the first
national campaign that the newly
formed HSUS launched focused on
that issue. During 1955 and 1956,
The HSUS diverted every available
dollar from its budget into the
drive for slaughterhouse reform
and generated widespread publicity on the issue. Myers lined up significant sources of public support
for the HSA and testified on its
behalf in 1958, the year in which it
passed (Unti 2004).
Myers took great encouragement
from the fact that, between 1954
and 1958, the animal protection
movement had united to achieve
passage of a federal humane
slaughter law that would spare
approximately 100 million animals
a year from pain and suffering. It
was also a vindication of the vision
that had driven the formation of
The HSUS, namely, the idea “that
hundreds of local societies could
lift their eyes from local problems
to a great national cruelty” (Unti
2004, 6). Passage of the HSA represented the first time since enactment of the 28-Hour Law (regulating how long livestock could be
transported without being given a
food and water rest) more than fifty
years earlier that the federal government had agreed to address an
animal welfare issue. By and large,
animal protection in the 1950s was
perceived to be the domain of the
state legislatures (e.g., anti-cruelty
and related legislation).
The HSA required slaughter
plants selling meat to the U.S. government (roughly 80 percent of all
U.S. meatpacking plants) to abide
by humane methods of slaughter
set by the federal government. The
U.S. government was the largest
purchaser of meat, buying $300
million worth annually (Unti 2004,
45). According to the law, cattle,
sheep, swine, goats, horses, mules,
and other equines must be slaugh-
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tered humanely, usually by rendering these animals “insensible to
pain by a single blow or gunshot or
an electrical, chemical, or other
means that is rapid and effective,
before being shackled, hoisted,
thrown, cast, or cut” (7 U.S.C.A.
§1902). One loophole in the law
permitted the armed forces to purchase meat that did not have to be
certified as humanely slaughtered

Table 2
States with
Felony-Level
Anti-Cruelty
Statutes
Year
Enacted

State(s)

1986

Wisc.

1987
1988

Calif.

1989

Fla.

1990
1991
1992

Neb.

1993

Mont.

1994

Del., Mo., N.H., Wash.

1995

La., Ore., Pa.

1996

Conn.

1997

Tex.

1998

Ind., N.C., Vt.

1999

Ariz., Ill., Nev., N.Y.,
Va.

2000

Ala., Ga., Iowa, S.C.

2001

D.C., Md., Minn., N.J.,
Tenn.

2002

Colo., Ohio, Me.

2003

Ky., W.V., Wy.

Source: www.hsus.org: Legislation and
Laws—Citizen Lobbyist Center.
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Figure 1
Percentage of Members of Congress
Co-sponsoring the Downed Animal
Protection Bill (102nd–107th Congress)

Source: HSUS (1994–2004).

as long as the purchased amount
did not exceed $2,500. While it is
unclear exactly how much meat
fell into this category, “a considerable portion of that volume [was]
understood to be acquired in lots
of $2,500 or less”(Animal Welfare
Institute 1990, 55).
Under the concerted efforts of
Sen. Robert Dole (R-KS) and Rep.
George E. Brown (D-CA), the HSA
was amended and renamed the
Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
( H M S A ) i n 1 9 7 8 . Wi t h t h i s
strengthened law, not only plants
that sold meat to the government
but also all plants that wanted to be
U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA)-certified had to follow the
humane methods of slaughter
guidelines. Federal inspectors had
the authority to shut down inhumane slaughter operations until
they were modified to comply with
humane standards (although such
action was very rare). Any meat imported into the United States had
to be from humanely slaughtered
animals. In 2002 the HMSA was
amended further to request that
the Secretary of Agriculture report
to Congress on the condition of
nonambulatory livestock (downed
animals) in slaughter houses.
“Downer” animals had become a
focus of increased animal protec82

tion concern well before 2002.
Since the 102nd Congress in 1994,
animal protection groups had lobbied for passage of the Downed Animal Protection Act, which would
end the slaughter of downed animals for human consumption. The
bill requires that any downed animal be euthanized before it reaches the slaughterhouse. A decade
after its first introduction in Congress, the Downed Animal Protection Act was added to the 2004
agriculture appropriations bill, only
to be removed at the last minute.
Shortly thereafter, when the first
case of so-called mad cow disease
was discovered in the United
States, Agriculture Secretary Ann
Veneman announced that downed
animals would be banned from the
human food chain. While this
administrative reaction could be
construed as something of a victory
for animal advocates, as of 2005,
the movement was still pushing for
passage of the Downed Animal Protection Act to give greater permanency to the existing administrative ban.
In assessing progress on the
downed animal issue, a more nuanced measure is needed than simple passage of the bill into law. One
possibility is to follow the level of
support via the number of cospon-

sors who sign on in each Congress.
Figure 1 illustrates the steady increase in the proportion of members of Congress who have cosponsored the Downed Animal
Protection Act, showing how support for the legislation has risen
over time.
While this increase may be a
measure of the effectiveness and
impact of lobbying by animal
activists, other forces are at work
as well. In The Washington Post
Warrick (2001) exposed the abusive violations of the HMSA in various slaughter facilities, describing
in detail how cattle remained alive
throughout the slaughter process.
Relying on the accounts of slaughter facility workers, inspectors,
and technicians, Warrick also described how such facilities were
allowed to continue to operate
despite being cited for numerous
violations of the HMSA.
The Washington Post article
prompted Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV)
to deliver a speech on July 9, 2001,
in the U.S. Senate asking for
stricter oversight of U.S. slaughter
facilities. In this passionate speech,
the first ever of its kind on farm
animals, Byrd exclaimed: “The law
clearly requires that these poor
creatures be stunned and rendered
insensitive to pain before this
process begins. Federal law is being ignored. Animal cruelty
abounds” (Congressional Record
2001, S7311). Between 2001 and
2004, $1 million was appropriated
to the USDA to hire seventeen
regional managers to oversee enforcement of the HMSA, as was an
additional $5 million to hire at
least fifty inspectors to work solely
on ensuring compliance with the
law (HSUS 2004).
Even taking into account the
1958 passage of the humane
slaughter legislation, its subsequent amendments, and the
increase in funding for it, the structural problems with enforcement of
the Act remain in place. As the animal movement continues to invesThe State of the Animals III: 2005

tigate slaughter facilities and gain
political ground, it presses to have
the HMSA amended again to
include poultry under its humane
standards. In 2004 People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals
(PETA) conducted an undercover
investigation of a slaughter facility. The findings of the investigation, including chickens being
kicked and thrown against a wall,
reached major media outlets
throughout the country. The video
footage not only prompted public
outrage, but it also created an
opportunity for the movement to
urge Congress to amend the
HMSA. Following the PETA investigation, The HSUS announced a
campaign to lobby for the inclusion of poultry in the HMSA and
offered a petition for individuals to
sign asking Congress for this
inclusion. As of mid-2005, more
than eighty thousand signatures
had been collected.
Despite the recent success in
obtaining legislation addressing
humane handling and slaughter of
livestock, there is considerable
room for improvement, not only in
the legislative underpinnings of
humane handling and slaughter
but also in the enforcement of the
existing but relatively rudimentary
legislation dealing with farm animal protection (especially important given the 8 billion animals a
year raised and slaughtered in the
United States). Everybody can
agree that animals should not be
badly handled and tormented when
they are transported and slaughtered. However, the law is still too
narrowly focused (it does not cover
religious slaughter and poultry, for
example) and it has been enforced
poorly from its implementation.
For example, USDA stations its
inspectors in slaughter facilities to
inspect and certify that animals are
slaughtered humanely, but these
inspectors receive their USDA paychecks via the companies they
inspect and are “embedded” in
those companies in ways that make

it very difficult for them to take
effective action if they see problems
with the slaughter process.

mal, but, after reauthorization,
export permits were no longer
necessary.

Marine Mammal
Animal Welfare Act:
Protection Act:
Assessment of
Assessment of Progress Progress
In 1972 the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was passed.
This law imposed a moratorium on
the “harassing, hunting, capturing, or killing” of all marine mammals. The Secretary of Commerce
may grant permits to allow the taking and importation of marine
mammals: (1) for scientific research or public display; (2) as
incidental bycatch in commercial
fishing; and (3) in accord with
sound principles of resource protection and conservation (16
U.S.C. §§ 1361–1421h). In 1992
the Dolphin Conservation Act was
added to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, banning certain tunaharvesting practices that threatened dolphin populations. The law
was amended again in 1994 to
reduce the incidental taking of
marine mammals during commercial fishing activities.
The MMPA is a relatively comprehensive law from the perspective of animal advocates, and the
United States is one of the few
countries with such a strong law.
The law does include certain exemptions to the moratorium,
however, such as capturing
marine animals for public display,
even when the educational value,
the basis for the exemption, is in
dispute. The law embodies de
facto credibility for educational
purposes; a marine mammal facility is not required to show how its
exhibit is educational. Plus, there
are no explicit standards for keeping such animals, and the standards that do exist are difficult to
enforce. Furthermore, the law was
weakened when it was reauthorized in 1994. Before 1994 one
needed explicit permission to
import or export a marine mam-
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Even before closing the HSA campaign in 1958, The HSUS had
begun to turn its attention to the
suffering of animals in research,
testing, and education, joining the
Animal Welfare Institute in a campaign to reform practices in the
country’s laboratories.
Generally speaking, the Animal
Welfare Act (AWA), enforced by
USDA, establishes the standards
that govern the humane handling,
care, treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers, research
facilities, and exhibitors and also
sets a standard by which animals
are handled for transportation in
commerce. While the law defines
“animal” as any warm-blooded animal used for research, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet, it excludes horses
not used for research purposes,
farm animals, and birds, mice, and
rats used in research (U.S.C. §§
2131–2159). It also prohibits
interstate transportation of animals, including live birds used for
fighting purposes.
The Laboratory Animal Welfare
Act was passed in 1966 “to provide
humane standards for dogs, cats,
primates, rabbits, hamsters, and
guinea pigs in animal dealers’
premises and in laboratories prior
to experimental use of animals”
(Animal Welfare Institute 1990,
77). It was later amended in 1970
(when it was renamed the Animal
Welfare Act) and amended further
in 1976, 1985, 1990, and 2002. In
1970 the amendments required
that the humane standards must be
applied not only before the experimental use of animals but also
throughout the entire stay of animals in laboratories. The amended
law applied to all warm-blooded
83

Figure 2
AWA Appropriations Funding,
1970–2004

Source: Tom Engle, APHIS/USDA, August 26, 2004.

animals determined by the Secretary of Agriculture as being used or
intended for use in experimentation or exhibition except horses not
used in research and farm animals
used in food and fiber research.
In 1976 the law was amended to
require research laboratories to pay
similar fines as those for animal
exhibitors and dealers who violated
the standards set by the AWA. A provision was added to prohibit interstate transportation of dogs used
for animal-fighting ventures. In
1985, in response to several public
scandals about the mistreatment of
laboratory animals in research projects, the guidelines regarding standards of care and alleviation of pain
and distress were made more specific. (For example, the law required
that the pain and distress suffered
by laboratory animals be reduced,
and that psychological well-being be
enhanced by providing adequate
exercise for dogs and an enriched
physical environment for primates.)
The AWA was amended again in
1990 to establish a holding period
for dogs and cats at shelters and
other holding facilities before sale
84

to dealers; in addition, dealers had
to provide written certification to
the recipient regarding each animal’s background.
In 1989 The HSUS and the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF)
resorted to litigation to reverse
USDA’s administrative exclusion of
rats, mice, and birds from regulatory coverage by the AWA. The litigation asked the U.S. District Court
to force USDA to protect all warmblooded animals used in research
laboratories. Although the district
court sided with the petitioners
and found that exclusion of rats,
mice, and birds from coverage was
an arbitrary and capricious action
by USDA, the appeals court later
ruled that the animal protection
groups did not have legal standing
to sue in federal court to force
USDA to change its decision.
In 1999 the American Anti-Vivisection Society (AAVS) filed a new
lawsuit on the issue. One year later
the court found that it had standing to sue for injunctive relief. At
this point, USDA decided to negotiate with the AAVS and reportedly
agreed to promulgate regulations

that would cover birds, rats, and
mice used in research. This development caused considerable alarm
among the medical research lobby,
which was able to have a rider
inserted into a federal appropriations bill that forbade USDA to use
any federal funds to promulgate
such regulations. In 2002 the particularly powerful senior senator
from North Carolina, Jesse Helms,
inserted an amendment into the
farm bill that permanently excluded rats, mice, and birds used in
research from AWA oversight. This
development indicated that, although the animal protection
movement has gained political
influence and public support, the
research lobby still has the ability
to get a few key politicians to listen
to its concerns. To date there are
no indications that the movement
will have sufficient influence to
reverse this loss because the public
is not that strongly moved by concern for the welfare of mice, rats,
and birds.
In 2002 an amendment was
added to prohibit interstate transportation of live birds for fighting
purposes. This amendment was
intended to hamper the illegal
cockfighting industry as well as
cockfighting activities in the last
two U.S. states, Louisiana and New
Mexico, where it remained legal as
of mid-2005. Since the amendment
was passed, several cockfighting
pits have been shut down. But part
of the original amendment that
would have established felony jail
penalties for engaging in an animal
fight was dropped during the conference committee discussion of
the 2002 farm bill (to which the
cockfighting AWA amendment was
attached). In 2003 and 2005, the
animal protection movement
continued its efforts on animal
fighting, and the Animal Fighting
Prohibition Act was introduced
authorizing felony penalties for animal fighting as well as a ban on the
interstate commerce of cockfighting implements.
The State of the Animals III: 2005

The animal movement has
argued that the AWA has not been
enforced adequately since it was
passed. Part of the problem has
been a lack of resources. In the
past ten to twenty years, an unlikely coalition of animal protection
and research defense groups has
been established to press for larger
budgets for AWA enforcement.
This is one of those areas where
everybody perceives a benefit from
more effective and more consistent enforcement. The AWA enforcement budget is shown in Figure 2 (the budget in actual dollars
is provided on one line; the budget
in inflation-adjusted dollars on the
other line). The inflation-adjusted
column indicates that real funding
for AWA enforcement increased in
two distinct periods. From 1989 to
1992 funding increased from
about $9 million to $12 million,
and from 2000 to 2003 funding
increased again, from approximately $11 million to $16 million.
The 81 percent increase in actual dollars (or the 50 percent
increase in inflation-adjusted dollars) appropriated for AWA enforcement from 1999 to 2003 has
arguably led to more effective oversight by USDA inspectors of the
approximately ten thousand sites
(including research institutes,
zoos, puppy mills, circuses and
other exhibitors, and commercial
breeders) because of the hiring of
more than forty additional inspectors (HSUS 2004). However, the
effectiveness of enforcement is not
simply a measure of how many
inspectors there are. From a perspective outside the Animal Care
section in USDA/APHIS (Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service), it would appear that enforcement of the AWA (and the morale
of the Animal Care staff) was more
effective at the end of the 1990s
than it is today. Certainly, the information mandated under the AWA is
much less available today, despite
expansion of the World Wide Web.
Thus, developments under the

AWA represent a mixed outcome.
The animal movement can point to
changes that reflect broader coverage and more effective enforcement, but there have also been setbacks (such as the rats, mice, and
birds issue). The movement still
has ambitions to expand coverage
of the AWA. There is no specific
language in the AWA that addresses the practice of mass commercial
breeding in puppy mills, for example, and guidelines for handling
repeat violators of basic humane
standards (e.g., adequate veterinary care, shelter, food, and sanitation) are inadequate. As a result,
some puppy mills that have been
cited more than once for AWA violations are still in business. The
animal protection community lobbied (first in the 107th congressional session and again in the
108th session) for the introduction
of the Puppy Protection Act. The
Puppy Protection Act would reduce
the number of times a female dog
may be whelped during a twentyfour-month period, prevent females under one year old from
being bred, and provide stricter
penalties for puppy mills violating
the AWA more than once in at least
eight months.

Comparing the
Political Impact of the
Animal Movement
While the 1950s and 1960s were
decades of growing political clout,
Table 3 compares the legislative
output on behalf of animals for the
five-year period 1999–2003 with
the five-year period 1979–1983. It
is apparent that there has been
more success in the most recent
five-year period across most species
groups, with the possible exception
of wildlife. However, two of the four
successes on behalf of wildlife from
1979 to 1983 are more accurately
described as conservation rather
than animal protection measures.
While the accomplishments listed
between 1979 and 1983 are
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exhaustive (not much occurred,
even though debate on several critical issues from the welfare of laboratory animals to those of horses
used in the racing industry could
constitute what Mill defined as the
“discussion” stage of a movement’s
development), the 1999–2003 accomplishments listed are, from a
subjective viewpoint, not an exhaustive listing of legislative accomplishments. There are still
more of them, however, than in the
period in the early eighties.
It should be noted that a discrepancy remains among the recent
federal accomplishments. Some
accomplishments—the Animal
Fighting Act and the additional
funding for the AWA, both the
result of the movement’s determination—indicate that the animal
protection movement is growing
strong. But some accomplishments, such as the Veneman decision regarding downed animals or
passage of the Captive Exotic Animal Protection Act (CEAPA), were
driven by events that originated
outside the movement’s planned
campaign activities. If mad cow
disease had not spread to the United States, downers would likely
have continued to be used in the
food chain, despite the repeated
efforts of animal protection lobbyists to stop the practice. In 2003
the captive exotic animal issue—
where the animal movement
sought to ban the keeping of exotic animals, such as lions, tigers,
jaguars, and cougars as pets—
gained national attention when
Roy Horn, of the famous Las Vegas
entertainment duo Siegfried and
Roy, was mauled by one of his own
tigers during a show. This event,
reinforced when a private citizen
was mauled by a pet tiger he was
keeping in his small Harlem apartment, received heavy media coverage and stimulated passage of the
CEAPA.

85

Table 3
Comparative Analysis of Federal Accomplishments
Major Federal Accomplishments
1979–1983
Animal Welfare Act

•Provision on marine mammal
care standards added

1999–2003
• USDA AWA enforcement budget
boosted by ca. 50 percent
• Interstate commerce in birds
and dogs used in animal
fighting prohibited

Companion Animals

• Banned dog and cat fur products

Cruelty Issues

• Banned “crush videos” (where
small animals are tortured/
crushed to death)

Farm Animals

• Obtained additional $6 million
for enforcement of Humane
Slaughter Act
• Banned the use of downer cattle
for human consumption
• Obtained $703,000 for hoop
barns for pig raising

Animals in Research

• Passed legislation authorizing the
Interagency Coordinating Committee
for the Validation of Alternative
Methods (ICCVAM)
• Passed legislation authorizing a
national sanctuary system for retired
laboratory chimpanzees

Wildlife

•Passed Alaska Lands bill—
designating more than 100 million
acres in Alaska as parks or wildlife
refuges
•Added Marine Mammal Protection
Act regulations
•National Park Service published
final regulations banning trapping
on some lands

• Banned commerce in big cats
for the pet trade
• Banned practice of cutting fins off
sharks and discarding their bodies
at sea while still alive

Source: Internal HSUS documents

State Legislation
While it is relatively simple to track
the growth of animal protection legislation at the federal level (there
are only two legislative bodies and
one executive), tracking and evaluating legislative advances in fifty
states is much more difficult and
beyond our capacity for a detailed
analysis in this relatively brief chapter. Therefore, we have chosen to
focus on one particular area of animal protection legislation, the passage of felony-level penalties as part
of state anti-cruelty laws.
For most of the twentieth centu86

ry, only a handful of states included
felony-level penalties in their anticruelty legislation. In the mid1980s, animal protection organizations began to highlight the link
between cruelty to animals and
other forms of human violence (the
name of the long-established HSUS
program on this issue, “First
Strike,” reflects the idea that the
animal is the first victim in a household to be abused). The fact that
animal cruelty or abuse is a potential indicator of individual violent
behavior (Lockwood and Ascione
1997) has driven considerable state

legislative activity since 1985. As of
the end of 2003, forty states and
the District of Columbia included
felony-level penalties in their anticruelty statutes (Table 4). Wisconsin, California, and Florida passed
felony penalty upgrades in the
1980s (Table 5). From 1990 to
1994, six more states did so, followed by another eleven states from
1995 to 1999, and another sixteen
from 2000 to 2003.
By any measure, these state legislative initiatives represent considerable progress for the animal protection movement over the last
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Table 4
Tracking Passage
of Felony Statutes
States with Felony
Anti-cruelty Legislation
1986–89

7

1990–93

9

1994–97

18

1998–2001

34

2002–2003

40

Source: www.hsus.org: Legislation and
Laws—Citizen Lobbyist Center.

twenty years. When most anticruelty statutes only carried misdemeanor penalties, animal organizations had trouble convincing the
police and courts to spend any time
on animal-cruelty crimes. Since
felony-level penalties were established, the police and courts have
taken a few egregious cases
through the courts, which consequently administered significant
penalties. Thus, in a notorious Iowa

case, where three youths broke
into a shelter and mutilated and
killed a number of cats, the leader
of the group received a two-year
jail sentence (Bollinger 1998).
The Iowa case illustrates why
states have agreed to institute
felony-level penalties. There are
some cases where it is clear that the
perpetrator of the abuse could be a
wider danger to society and where
the courts need to administer more
significant penalties than a few-hundred-dollar fine. A.N.R. (in Ascione
and Arkow 1999) has argued that
one may classify cases of animal suffering caused by humans in four
basic categories: intentional cruelty, in which the perpetrator gains
satisfaction from the animal suffering; abuse, in which the behavior is
mainly a release of emotional energy
and where the animal’s suffering is a
by-product rather than a necessary
component for the perpetrator; neglect, in which the animal’s suffering
is caused by the ignorance or laziness of the perpetrator; and use, in
which the animal may suffer but the
activity is sanctioned by society
(e.g., animal research, trapping, fac-

tory farming). Of these, the most
serious is intentional cruelty because it predicts significant future
(or current) sociopathic behavior
against other humans and animals.
Fortunately, intentional cruelty is
rare, as is animal abuse. Most
reported cases of animal cruelty fall
into the neglect category. We were
curious, therefore, to see how the
felony-level upgrades dealt with
issues of intentionality.
Favre and Loring (1983, 145) put
forth four critical questions that
must be asked when comparing
state cruelty statutes: (1) Which animals are protected by the statute?
(2) Which humans are held responsible? (3) What is the scope of care
that is to be provided? (4) How is
the duty (to provide certain care)
qualified or exempted? With a large
majority of states now having felonylevel provisions, one must also consider (5) the circumstances that
might lead to prosecution of a felony
versus a misdemeanor. From the animal protection perspective, the intent of the perpetrator to cause
deliberate and premeditated animal
suffering or to engage in gratuitous-

Table 5
State Anti-cruelty Legislation
with a Consideration for Language of Intent
Felony
Legislation?
No Felony

Felony

Language of Intent

No. of
States

States

No language of intent

0

Language of intent

9

Alaska, Ark., Hawaii, Idaho, Kans., Miss.,
N.D., S.C., Utah

No language of intent in either

3

Minn., Nev., S.D.

Language of intent in felony
but not misdemeanor

14

language of intent in
misdemeanor but not felony

1

Language of intent in both

24

Calif., Conn., Del., D.C., Fla., Ill., Mass.,
Neb., N.H., N.J., N.M., Ohio, Okla., W.V.
Mo.
Ala., Ariz., Colo., Ga., Iowa, Ind., Ky., La.,
Md., Me., Mich., Mont., N.C., N.Y., Ore.,
Pa., R.I., Tenn., Tex., Va., Vt., Wash., Wis.,
Wyo.

Source: State felony laws that can be found on state websites or databases such as Lexis-Nexis.
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ly abusive behavior would seem to be
a relatively simple way to distinguish
between animal-cruelty cases that
fall under the felony provisions and
those that remain misdemeanors.
However, more careful examination
of the laws that have been passed
and the way in which they are implemented reveals that there is little
underlying logic to the felony-penalty upgrades or to the way the courts
apply the anti-cruelty statutes.
The legislative language of intent
includes a variety of words in the definitions of animal cruelty: “intentionally,” “willfully,” “knowingly,”
“maliciously,” and/or “purposefully.”
Comparing the definitions of these
words in the widely used Black’s
Law Dictionary (Black et al. 1990),
for example, provides little useful
guidance on how these terms might
be defined and distinguished. Lawyers might argue that state laws cannot be understood fully without
looking at their implementation
during court proceedings and case
outcomes.
Favre and Loring (1983) separated animal-cruelty statutes into two
different categories, those without
any language of intent and those
with such language. All fifty states
and the District of Columbia have
animal-cruelty statutes. Three
states (Minnesota, Nevada, and
South Dakota) do not use language
of intent at all (Table 5). Of the
forty states and the District of
Columbia with felony provisions,
1
seventeen use the identical language in their felony and misdemeanor provisions (whether language of intent is included or not).
Usually, offenders committing more
than one offense “graduate” to
receiving felony-level penalties in
subsequent violations of the misdemeanor language. Connecticut, one
of the seventeen states, is an exception: a violator of one portion of the
animal-cruelty statute (containing
no language of intent) may be subjected to either a misdemeanor or
felony-level penalty. However, in
another portion of the statute
88

where language of intent is used,
the offender, if convicted, must be
charged with a felony (Table 5).
In statutes where the language
differs between the felony and misdemeanor portions, those of nine
states2 and the District of Columbia
use some form of language of intent
in their felony portions but not in
their misdemeanor portions. Generally, one could therefore determine
that, for these statutes, evidence of
intent surrounding an act of animal
cruelty automatically amounts to a
more serous violation of the law.
Granted, the act of cruelty (e.g.,
mutilation versus general neglect)
may factor into stricter penalties.
However, there are nine examples
where there is a correlation between
intent and level of crime. All of the
remaining states3 without felonylevel penalties already include language of intent in their misdemeanor provisions. If these weaker
cruelty laws are eventually strengthened to include felony penalties, one
might question how the felony language would be constructed and, in
turn, differentiated from the current
misdemeanor language.
One possibility looks at the type
of cruelty associated with the language of intent. Alabama, Illinois,
and Kentucky have misdemeanor
and felony provisions that both use
language of intent; however, the
felony provisions only apply to
companion animals. (In Pennsylvania the felony provision only
applies to zoo animals.)
The four states identified in
Table 6 (California, Florida, Illinois, and Oregon) exemplify different ways in which language of
intent is positioned. California has
inserted intent language in the
felony provision, while the original
misdemeanor language includes
terms such as mutilation, torture,
and killing of an animal. California’s anti-cruelty statute seems
especially strong for two critical
reasons: if any evidence of intent is
present, the offender must be convicted of a felony, but an offender

may also be convicted of a felony
even if intent is not present.
In Florida, as in California, the
felony provision contains language
of intent, but the misdemeanor
language does not. The felony
penalty does not include the misdemeanor language, and the acts
under the felony penalty are seemingly more severe than those under
the misdemeanor penalty.
Unlike other states that tend to
lump cruel acts together, Illinois
separates different types of cruelty
into distinct categories. Basic animal cruelty (e.g., beating, starving,
overworking, cruelly treating) falls
into the misdemeanor category,
while repeated offenses, “aggravated cruelty,” and “animal torture”
are categorized as felonies. Both
aggravated cruelty and animal torture include language of intent. In
the case of aggravated cruelty, the
word “intentionally” is used; animal
torture includes the terms “knowingly” and “intentionally.” This raises the question of why certain language is used in parts of some
statutes and not in others. The
analysis of statute language raises
questions about the consistency of
the language of intent—what is
used and why. In the Oregon
statutes, “intentionally” and “knowing” precede all acts of animal cruelty marking a misdemeanor, but in
the felony language, “maliciously”
is used solely when an animal is
killed, while “intentionally” and
“knowingly” are linked to torture.
To assess the impact of one
recent state felony anti-cruelty law,
it is useful to look at the experience
in Texas. The existing law was
amended in 2001, producing several years of experience in the application of the felony penalty. In June
2004 Fikac (2004) reported the
number of individuals convicted of a
felony since 2001, based on data
provided by the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice (DCJ): twentyone people had served state prison
time since the 2001 law was enacted, with six of them still in prison at
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that time. The number excluded
the people who were convicted of a
felony but were given probation and
those who were jailed on a misdemeanor conviction.
The authors were given the

names of twenty of the convicted
felons by Texas DCJ. A search was
conducted in two databases: LexisNexis and a database of news clippings on reported animal-cruelty
cases throughout the country main-

tained by The HSUS. Using the
Lexis-Nexis database, we were able
to find the jail time served by fourteen of the twenty felons and the
type of felony with which they were
charged, but we were not given any

Table 6
Four-State Analysis of Language of Intent
State

Year Felony
Law Passed/
Amended

Felony Language

Misdemeanor Language

Calif.

1988

Every person who maliciously* and
intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures,
or wounds a living animal, or maliciously
and intentionally kills an animal.

Every person who overdrives, overloads,
drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures,
torments, deprives of necessary sustenance,
drink, or shelter, cruelly beats, mutilates,
or cruelly kills any animal, or causes or
procures any animal to be so overdriven,
overloaded, driven when overloaded
overworked, tortured, tormented, deprived
of necessary sustenance, drink, shelter, or to
be cruelly beaten, mutilated, or cruelly killed;
and whoever, having the charge or custody
of any animal, either as owner or otherwise,
subjects any animal to needless suffering, or
inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the animal,
or in any manner abuses any animal, or fails
to provide the animal with proper food, drink,
or shelter or protection from the weather,
or who drives, rides, or otherwise uses the
animal when unfit for labor.

Language identical to a misdemeanor
offense.

Fla.

1989, 1999

A person who intentionally commits an
act to any animal which results in the
cruel death, or excessive or repeated
infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering,
or causes the same to be done.

A person who unnecessarily overloads,
overdrives, torments, deprives of necessary
sustenance or shelter, or unnecessarily
mutilates, or kills any animal, or causes the
same to be done, or carries in or upon any
vehicle, or otherwise, any animal in a cruel
or inhumane manner.

Ill.

1999

Cruel treatment or second or subsequent
offense.

Cruel treatment: Beat, cruelly treat, starve,
overwork, or otherwise abuse any animal.

Aggravated cruelty: intentionally commit
an act that causes a companion animal to
suffer serious injury or death.
Animal torture: Knowingly or intentionally
causes the infliction of or subjection to
extreme physical pain, motivated by an
intent to increase or prolong the pain,
suffering or agony of the animal.

Ore.

1995

A person commits the crime of aggravated
animal abuse in the first degree if the
person: maliciously kills an animal; or
intentionally or knowingly tortures an
animal.

A person commits the crime of animal abuse
in the first degree if, except as otherwise
authorized by law, the person intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly: causes serious
physical injury to an animal; or cruelly
causes the death of an animal.

Source: State felony laws that can be found on state websites or databases such as Lexis-Nexis. *Emphasis added in boldface throughout.
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information on the type of animal
cruelty any had committed. The
HSUS database of approximately
1,300 clippings a year found reports
of only three of the twenty felons.
Those pushing for more effective
animal-cruelty legislation should
take steps to make sure that their
state law: (1) applies to all animals; (2) applies to first-time
offenders; (3) has large fines and
lengthy prison time as penalties;
(4) has no exemptions; (5) allows or
requires convicted abusers to get
counseling at their own expense;
and (6) prohibits abusers from possessing animals or living where animals are present (www.hsus.org:
Legislation and Laws/Citizen Lobbyist Center).
In 2005 animal advocates in
Texas were working to strengthen
their anti-cruelty law again. When
news broke that a man used his
lawnmower to run over his puppy,
and that he could not be prosecuted because the current law only
applies to harming another person’s animal, the urgency to correct this loophole heightened. Not
only would the introduced bill
amend the current law to apply to
those who abuse their own animal
in a cruel manner, but it expands
the definition of “animal” to
include harming another person’s
livestock and the cruel killing of
stray and wild animals (Fikac
2005).
This anecdotal analysis of anticruelty statutes and their enforcement indicates how idiosyncratic
anti-cruelty legislation across the
country is, how little logic is
applied to developing language
that clearly discriminates between
types of animal abuse, and how difficult it is to follow up on how
effective enforcement of both the
misdemeanor and the felony provisions can be. Thus, one must conclude that the animal protection
movement has made significant
progress in upgrading anti-cruelty
legislation, but the underlying
logic of many of the changes is
90

confusing, and how the laws are
enforced (the most important
measure of a successful outcome)
is very difficult to measure.

Animal Protection
Initiatives
4

The animal protection movement
has used state initiative petitions
at various stages in the twentieth
century but with limited success
until fairly recently. Between 1940
and 1988, animal advocates qualified just a handful of animal protection initiatives, and only one of
them passed—a 1972 measure in
South Dakota to ban dove hunting,
which was reversed eight years
later. Voters in other states rejected a series of initiatives restricting
the killing of wildlife. For instance,
in 1983 Maine voters rejected a
ban on moose hunting; Ohio and
Oregon voters rejected anti-trapping initiatives in 1978 and 1980,
respectively.
Since 1990, however, there has
been a proliferation of animal protection initiatives (Tables 7a,b).
Voters have approved seventeen of
twenty-five animal protection ballot initiatives on subjects ranging
from cockfighting to bear baiting,
from horse slaughter to canned
hunts and the factory farming of
pigs. During this period, more than
four million signatures of registered voters have been gathered,
largely by animal advocates, to
qualify the twenty-five initiatives.
Most of the initiatives have been
spearheaded by the organizing
efforts of The HSUS and The Fund
for Animals. They carefully identified winnable issues in demographically favorable states, and they
organized volunteer petitioners,
conducted public attitude surveys
to guide the wording of the petitions, raised money, and persuaded
voters to support the initiatives,
primarily by airing emotionally
compelling advertising showing
direct harm to animals.

Since 1991 the animal movement’s victories in the initiative
process have been plentiful and
diverse. For example, animal advocates have worked to place antitrapping initiatives on seven ballots since 1995, prevailing in five
instances. Six other initiatives
dealt with hound hunting and baiting of predators, and animal advocates prevailed in four of them.
One measure related to the shooting of captive animals, in so-called
canned hunts, and two measures
related to the airborne hunting of
wolves in Alaska. Voters approved
all three of these measures.
These victories have been built
on a proven formula for predicting
the success of an initiative. The animal issue must be selected carefully and must be “right” for that particular state. State residents must
be polled to determine if there is
enough support for an issue. The
state must have people who can
donate money for the initiative,
newspapers and other media outlets must support the issue, and the
initiative must address a long overdue reform. (For an example of the
last of these, before the 2002 initiative that banned cockfighting,
Oklahoma was one of only three
states where cockfighting was still
legal, and a ban of the blood sport
was long overdue.)
The success of animal protection
initiatives is even more impressive
when considering that humane
advocates have not been able to
leverage huge financial advantages
to secure victories. On the contrary,
in some cases, including the 1994
measure in Oregon to ban bear baiting and hound hunting, animal protection groups have overcome the
lopsided financial advantages
enjoyed by their opponents. At the
same time, hunting groups have
been successful only in those cases
where they amassed huge war chests
that allowed them to blitz voters
with their message and erode public
support for animal protection initiatives. For example, hunting groups
The State of the Animals III: 2005

Table 7a
Animal Protection Initiatives and Referendums—Wins
Wins

Percentage Percentage
Voting
Voting
Yes
No

1990

Calif.

Proposition 117: prohibits sport hunting of mountain lions

52

48

1992

Colo.

Amendment 10: prohibits spring, bait, and hound hunting of black bears

70

30

1994

Ariz.

Proposition 201: prohibits steel-jawed traps and other body-gripping traps

58

42

Ore.

Measure 18: bans bear baiting and hound hunting of mountain lions

52

48

Alaska

Measure 3: bans same-day airborne hunting of wolves and foxes

58

42

Calif.

Proposition 197*: allows trophy hunting of mountain lions

42

58

Colo.

Amendment 14: bans leghold traps and other body-gripping traps

52

48

Mass.

Question 1: restricts steel-jawed traps and other body-gripping traps,
bans hound hunting of bears and bobcats, and eliminates quota for
hunters on Fisheries and Wildlife Board

64

36

Measure 34*: repeals ban on bear baiting and hound hunting of bears
and cougars

42

58

Initiative 655: bans bear baiting and hound hunting of bears, cougars,
bobcats, and lynx

63

37

Ariz.

Proposition 201: prohibits cockfighting

68

32

Calif.

Proposition 4: bans the use of cruel and indiscriminate traps and poisons

57

43

Calif.

Proposition 6: prohibits slaughter of horses and sale of horse meat for
human consumption

59

41

Colo.

Amendment 13: provides uniform regulations of livestock

39

61

Colo.

Amendment 14: regulates commercial hog factories

62

38

Mo.

Proposition A: prohibits cockfighting

63

37

Alaska

Measure 1*: bans wildlife issues from ballot

36

64

Alaska

Measure 6: bans land-and-shoot wolf hunting

53

47

Ariz.

Proposition 102*: require two-thirds majority for wildlife issues

38

62

Mont.

Initiative 143: prohibits new game farm licenses

52

48

Wash.

Initiative 713: restricts steel-jawed traps and certain poisons

55

45

Ariz.

Proposition 201: expands gambling at greyhound tracks

20

80

Fla.

Amendment 10: bans gestation crates for pigs

55

45

Ga.

Measure 6*: specialty license plate for spay/neuter

71

29

Okla.

State Question 687: bans cockfighting

56

44

Okla.

State Question 698*: increases signature requirement for animal issues

46

54

1996

Ore.
Wash.
1998

2000

2002

Note: Italics indicate bad measures that were defeated. * Referendum (referred to ballot by state legislature).
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Table 7b
Animal Protection Initiatives and Referendums—Losses
Percentage Percentage
Voting
Voting
Yes
No

Losses
1992

Ariz.

Proposition 200: bans steel-jawed traps and other body-gripping traps

38

62

1996

Idaho

Proposition 2: bans spring bait, and hound hunting of black bears

40

60

Mich.

Proposal D: bans baiting and hounding of black bears

38

62

Mich.

Proposal G*: exclusive authority over wildlife to National Resources
Committee in Mich.

64

36

Alaska

Proposition 9: bans wolf snare trapping

36

64

Minn.

Amendment 2: constitutional recognition of hunting

77

23

Ohio

Issue 1: restores ban on mourning dove hunting

40

60

Utah

Proposition 5*: requires two-thirds majority for wildlife ballot issues

56

44

Mass.

Question 3: bans greyhound racing

49

51

N.D.

Question 1: constitutional recognition of hunting

77

23

Ore.

Measure 97: restricts steel-jawed traps and certain poisons

59

41

Va.

Question 2*: constitutional recognition of hunting

60

40

Ark.

Initiated Act 1: increases penalties for animal cruelty

38

62

1998

2000

2002

* Referendum (referred to ballot by state legislature).
Source: Internal HSUS document on ballot measures.

spent $1.8 million against an antitrapping initiative in Arizona in
1992. They spent $2.5 million in
Michigan and $750,000 in Idaho
against initiatives to ban bear hunting, and $2.5 million against the
dove hunting ban in Ohio. Hunting
groups outspent animal advocates
by margins of from four to one to
ten to one in these campaigns.
Animal advocates have not used
large amounts of cash to qualify
measures for the ballots, either.
Generally, they have deployed volunteer petitioners to collect signatures for ballot measures. Conventional wisdom is that initiative
qualification in California requires
a minimum of $1 million for signature collection, but in 1990, Proposition 117, the mountain lion initiative, relied exclusively on volunteer
petitioners, and less than $500,000
was required to collect the neces92

sary signatures. In 1998 the California group Protect Pets and Wildlife,
a coalition of humane organizations
dedicated to banning the use of
steel-jawed leghold traps, spent
about $350,000 to amass more
than 700,000 signatures, relying
largely on seven thousand volunteer
petitioners. In Massachusetts in
1995–96, animal advocates spent
only $25,000 to gather nearly
200,000 signatures to add a measure to restrict trapping to the
November ballot.
Not only have opponents tried to
thwart efforts by animal advocates
by outspending them, but they
have also organized measures to
make it more difficult to pass animal protection initiatives. They
have tried to raise the standard for
both qualification and voter
approval of measures. In 1996 Idaho
hunting groups soundly defeated

Proposition 2 to ban spring bear
hunting and the use of dogs or bait
to hunt bears. Their formula for success was a campaign targeting “outof-state animal rights extremists”
who, they charged, wanted to do
away with “Idaho freedoms.” They
spent nearly $800,000 to defeat the
measure, while proponents spent
just a fraction of that amount in
support of the measure. Hunting
groups then succeeded in passing
sweeping changes to the initiative
process, drastically reducing the
time allowed for petitioning and
requiring that petitioners collect
signatures dispersed throughout the
state. For example, petitioners had
to amass at least 6 percent of registered voters in twenty-two of the
state’s forty-four counties. Before
that stipulation, there were no geographic distribution requirements.
Since many of the initiative victoThe State of the Animals III: 2005

ries affect hunting of wildlife,
hunters have used either the initiative process or the state legislature
to pass resolutions that recognize
hunting as a constitutional right.
Initiatives preserving the constitutional right to hunt have been
passed in Alaska, North Dakota, and
Virginia. Animal advocates, while
not supporting such measures, have
not been interested in pouring time
and money into defeating them.
Overall, animal advocates have
been victorious 67 percent of the
time since 1991. While this may be
a significant number in itself, it is
crucial to weigh the significance of
each ballot initiative in its own
right. For example, one of the most
important initiative wins for the
animal protection movement was
passage of the 1992 Colorado
Amendment 10, which prohibited
sport hunting of bears in the spring
and the use of baits and/or hounding. The first of its kind to succeed
in the initiative process, this measure set a precedent; Oregon, Massachusetts, and Washington later
passed similar measures. The 2002
Florida initiative banning the use of
gestation crates for pregnant sows
was the first measure to be passed
regarding animals involved in
agribusiness. The success of this
initiative has opened the door for
animal advocates to consider using
the initiative process in other
states to effect further reforms on
behalf of farm animals.
While animal advocates sustained
occasional setbacks—each one produced by the substantial investment
of dollars by opposition groups—
the movement has used the initiative process carefully to obtain
some basic protections for animals.
The animal movement’s victories
have demonstrated that its values
strike a chord with the public.
These victories have also signaled to
policy makers that animal protection demands cannot be summarily
dismissed. The initiatives have provided another measure of confidence to animal advocates in the

political sphere, prompting additional investment not only in initiative campaigns, but also in traditional legislative campaigns.

Conclusion
From 1900 to 1950, the animal protection movement had relatively little political clout. In Moyer’s model,
the movement was in stage one and
two. In the 1950s the movement
began to have success passing new
legislation, and it began to grow as
new animal protection organizations were established. It steadily
moved into Moyer’s stage three. In
the late ’70s and early ’80s, it
moved into stage four as the media
discovered “animal rights” and gave
the movement significant exposure.
In the 1990s media attention
changed (Herzog 1995). While reference to animal issues and the
movement itself became much
more common in the media marketplace (e.g., several Seinfeld
episodes involved animal rights
issues), the cover stories that
focused on the movement became
much less common. Some in the
movement saw this decline as a failure and resorted to more aggressive
tactics, while others recognized
that animal protection could now
command a place in public policy
discussions and took advantage of
the openings presented.
Although the animal protection
movement has been able to gain
significant protection for animals
in the past twenty years, much
remains to be done. Moyer’s movement model predicts that, as successes are gained and animal protection reforms are incorporated
into the public agenda, the movement itself will wane. Such weakening is not inevitable. The movement’s influence can continue to
grow and expand; while protecting
animals should always be the focus,
this focus must be viewed in conjunction with appropriate goals to
gain more measurable outcomes
and thus more social acceptance
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and political clout. The movement
must continue working to correct
earlier shortcomings and to push
the envelope on behalf of animals
to be resourceful and effective.
Notes

1California (lesser felony with identical language. No language of intent); Colorado (second or subsequent offense; knowingly); Connecticut (no language of intent); Iowa (second
or subsequent offense; intentionally); Illinois
(for cruel treatment; no language of intent);
Indiana (second or subsequent offense, knowingly, intentionally); Minnesota: (second conviction w/in five years); North Carolina: (same
language, intentionally); Nebraska (subsequent offenses); New Hampshire (second or
subsequent offense); New Mexico (fourth or
subsequent offense); Nevada (guilty after third
offense); Ohio (for second offense only); Pennsylvania (subsequent offenses; willfully, maliciously); Tennessee (second or subsequent
offense; intentionally, knowingly); Texas (third
conviction; intentionally, knowingly); and Vermont (second offense).
2California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and New Mexico.
3Alaska; Arkansas; Hawaii; Idaho; Kansas;
Mississippi (language of intent only when pertaining to dogs); North Dakota; South Carolina; and Utah.
4A significant portion of the data has been
taken from Pacelle 2001 and 2003 with the
permission of the author.
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